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Abstract: Mill defines utilitarianism as the combination of a “theory of life” and a moral claim: only 
pleasure and freedom from pain are desirable as ends, and the promotion of happiness is the sole goal 
of moral action. So defined, utilitarianism is open to ad hominem pessimistic objection: a “theory of 
life” which entails the impossibility of happiness fits poorly with a morality centered on its promotion. 
The first two challenges Mill confronts in Utilitarianism share this pessimistic structure. Interestingly, 
however, these challenges paint inverted pictures of the best utilitarian life: one suggests this life is 
satisfying but ignoble, the other that it is noble but unsatisfying. I explain Mill’s treatment of both 
challenges as genuinely pessimistic interpretations of utilitarianism’s “theory of life.” Read through the 
lens of Mill’s engagement with pessimism, these challenges point to distinctive conceptions of dignity 
and satisfaction that play a significant role in Mill’s ethics.  
 
 
 In his Autobiography, John Stuart Mill describes a crisis in his early life, a period during which 
he found no value in his existence. This struck Mill as more than a personal misfortune: he feared that 
“the flaw in my life, must be a flaw in life itself”(CW 1.149). Mill's crisis, then, led to a natural 
engagement with pessimism, the claim that human happiness is an impossibility.1 
 
1 Although it is easy to recognize Mill’s worry as an engagement with pessimism, Mill himself never describes it 
as such. This is unsurprising, as the term pessimism was just working its way into English during Mill's 
lifetime (see Zanker 2011: 84-86 for a history of the term’s development). It is used to describe a sour attitude 
towards life as early as 1815, but does not become identified with a philosophical view about the 
impossibility of happiness until after Schopenhauer’s rise to prominence in the 1850s. When James Sully 
publishes his Pessimism, a History and a Criticism four years after Mill’s death, it is still necessary to note 
that most English readers will be unfamiliar with the term’s use to describe a philosophy rather than a 
disposition (Sully 1877: 1-2). 
Mill’s engagement with political pessimism has received some attention. A variety of papers (e.g., 
Adams 1992: 445-446; Corcoran 2019) have discussed Mill’s struggle to believe in social and political 
progress. The pessimism I consider differs from this variety by a lack of focus on distributional concerns and 
the absence of a temporal dimension: the question is not whether more people will be happy tomorrow than 
today, but whether it is possible for any people to be happy at all. The pessimism I discuss likewise differs 
from what Messina calls Mill’s “pessimism about human nature”(2020: 8): his fear that human beings have 
innate tendencies to treat each other unjustly. The question at hand is whether any human beings are capable 
of happiness, not whether they tend to find that happiness at each other’s expense. Mill’s engagement with 
this starker pessimism has not received significant attention outside of direct analysis of his crisis in the 
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In what follows, I examine the first two challenges Mill confronts in Utilitarianism’s second 
chapter. I suggest that these challenges are best understood through the lens of Mill’s engagement with 
pessimism. Both challenges share a common structure: each suggests utilitarianism entails the truth of 
pessimism, and each assumes that pessimism and utilitarianism cannot be true at once. I will refer to 
challenges with this structure as pessimistic challenges. They are a variety of ad hominem critique 
which suggests that a position is undermined by entailing a pessimism that is incompatible with it.2  
 Utilitarianism’s second chapter is entitled “What Utilitarianism Is”(CW 10.209). It serves a 
clarificatory role. Later chapters offer positive arguments in utilitarianism’s favor. Chapter two simply 
defends utilitarianism against misrepresentation.3 The chapter opens with a two-part definition of 
utilitarianism: utilitarianism combines a moral claim – actions are right insofar as they promote 
happiness – with a “theory of life” – pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as 
ends (CW 10.210). The rest of the chapter rebuts ad hominem challenges to this position, replying to a 
series of critics who use these two utilitarian premises to ground unacceptable conclusions. Mill argues 
that these critics misconstrue the views they reject: the critics take utilitarianism to have these 
unfortunate implications because they misunderstand either the theory of life or the moral claim on 
which it is based.  
 It is in this context that Mill confronts the two pessimistic challenges I discuss. Like all 
challenges in the chapter, the first two build an ad hominem case against utilitarianism. What is 
distinctive about them is the structure of their critiques. Both challenges seek to create a tension 
between utilitarianism’s two central views. They do this by arguing that utilitarianism’s theory of life 
undercuts its moral claim. For reasons to be discussed below, these critics hold that if pleasure is the 
 
Autobiography.      
2 Pessimistic challenges are ad hominem in the following sense: they are arguments built around premises 
accepted by an opponent rather than premises accepted by the person making the argument.  
3 Mill lays out this division of labor in chapter one’s final paragraph (CW 10.208).  
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sole object of human desire, then human happiness is an impossibility.4 If human happiness is an 
impossibility, then promoting it cannot be the goal of moral action. The utilitarian is forced to 
compromise one of the constitutive views of her philosophy: either her theory of life or her moral claim 
must go.5  
 Mill replies that these challenges misrepresent utilitarianism’s theory of life by failing to 
recognize the diversity of human pleasure. The critics claim that identifying pleasure as the sole object 
of human desire entails the impossibility of human happiness. What really entails this, however, is 
identifying an impoverished subset of human pleasure as the sole object of human desire.  
 An extensive and helpful literature has built up around this response and its broader 
implications for Mill’s qualitative hedonism. I will not be contributing to that literature here. I am not 
directly interested in Mill’s response to these challenges. Rather, I am interested in his reasons for 
taking them seriously. Although Mill thinks these critics misrepresent utilitarianism’s theory of life, he 
grants that their charges would go through were this not the case. He accepts, in other words, that 
pessimism really is entailed by the impoverished theory of life these critics attribute to utilitarianism. 
That Mill accepts this is particularly interesting due to the divergence between the critics’ complaints 
about the pleasure desirer’s best life. The first group suggests that this life would be satisfying but 
ignoble. The second, that it would be noble but unsatisfying. Mill accepts that the pleasure desirer’s 
best life would be unhappy on either of these descriptions. My goal will be to bring out Mill’s reasons 
for treating both of these challenges as genuinely pessimistic challenges. Mill grants that happiness 
 
4 For convenience, I will speak of the utilitarian theory of life as identifying pleasure as the sole object of human 
desire. This abbreviates the theory, which recognizes freedom from pain as an object of desire on the same 
level as pleasure. 
5 These critics have different views about which part of utilitarianism should be abandoned. This difference does 
not change the structure of their critiques. Considered as ad hominem, both challenges gain their force by 
suggesting a tension between utilitarianism’s central claims. That these critics also take utilitarianism’s 
central claims to be in tension with the truth – that the first group takes utilitarianism to have a false theory of 
life and the second takes it to have a false moral claim – is not relevant to the charges’ structure as ad 
hominem critiques.  
4 
would be equally out of reach were the best human life satisfying but ignoble or noble but unsatisfying. 
Why does he do so? 
My approach will be most similar to that taken in accounts of Mill’s crisis. Like this literature, I 
try to explain Mill’s thought about potential obstacles to human happiness. By focusing on a different 
text, however, I highlight Mill’s concern about a different set of obstacles. Thus, I will offer an account 
of Mill’s reasons for endorsing two claims not yet discussed in the crisis literature: 1) a life that cannot 
be noble is unhappy, and 2) an unsatisfying life is unhappy.6 
In offering this account, I hope to highlight Mill’s possession of significant and distinctive ideas 
about the kinds of dignity and satisfaction essential to human happiness. Discussions focused on Mill’s 
response to the challenges have no need to consider his conceptions of dignity and satisfaction in detail: 
a broad presentation is sufficient to ground important claims about Mill’s qualitative hedonism.7 By 
focusing on the challenges themselves, I give these features of Mill’s ethics the detailed attention they 
deserve.  
 
I. Pessimism and Pessimistic Challenges 
 
In what follows, I offer an account of the first two anti-utilitarian challenges as pessimistic 
challenges. I understand a pessimistic challenge as one with two features: it suggests both 1) that a 
 
6  The crisis literature has discussed various claims with similar structures but notably different content. A life 
devoted to subjective pleasures is unhappy: such pleasures dissolve in the face of reason (Anderson 1991 and 
Vogler 2001). A life bound by rigid habits is unhappy: rigid habits create a mismatch between motivation and 
behavior (Milligram 2011). A life devoted to negative ends is unhappy: making life less bad cannot make it 
good (Setiya 2017). A life devoted to finite objects is unhappy: the pleasure we take in such objects runs out 
too soon (Heydt 2006). Mill can consistently worry about many different obstacles to happiness. The worries 
I focus on are of interest because they differ from these, not because they contradict them.  
7 To give a few examples: all Anderson 1991 and Brink 2013 need is the claim that the sense of dignity involves 
a non-hedonic value judgment; all West 2003 needs is the claim that the sense of dignity involves a second-
order pleasure. These claims have significant implications for Mill’s qualitative hedonism, but say little about 
the sense of dignity itself. Why does Mill consider this particular non-hedonic value judgment or this 
particular second-order pleasure so important?  
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position is incompatible with pessimism and 2) that this same position entails pessimism. To see the 
challenges in these terms, it will help to first say more about how I understand pessimism itself.  
Pessimism questions life’s value to the one who lives it. One way to do this is by claiming that 
even the best possible human life falls short of happiness. A happy life is one that provides certain 
benefits to the person living it. In suggesting that human life cannot be happy, the pessimist claims that 
some of the benefits a happy life would provide are unavailable to us. She thus questions life’s value to 
the one who lives it in the relatively mild sense of claiming that we never get quite as much out of our 
lives as the idea of happiness suggests. Alternatively, the pessimist might make a much stronger claim, 
asserting that even the best possible human life is not worth living.8 On the first understanding, 
pessimism can allow that human life is more beneficial than harmful, as long as life’s benefits still fall 
short of what the concept of happiness leads us to expect. On the second understanding, pessimism 
must assert that the preponderance of harmful over beneficial aspects of human life is so extreme that it 
would be better not to exist at all than to exist as a human being. For the purposes of this paper, I will 
identify claims as pessimistic if they meet the demands of the first, weaker understanding of 
pessimism. I will, however, treat claims as bearing greater pessimistic force as they approach the 
requirements of the second understanding. When it is helpful to draw a distinction between these two 
varieties of pessimism, I will do so using the terms weak pessimism and strong pessimism, where weak 
pessimism refers to the claim that even the best possible human life is not a happy one, and strong 
pessimism refers to the claim that even the best possible human life is not worth living.   
 Having pointed to a place where pessimism allows some variety, it will help to note a few of its 
firmer limits. Thus, pessimism attributes a flaw to life itself: it views the impossibility of happiness as 
more than a contingent matter, asserting that human beings can never find happiness in our world. As 
 
8 This was the standard claim during pessimism’s 19th century heyday (Beiser 2016: 4). Mill was intimately 
familiar with this view, describing his father’s position in strikingly similar terms: James Mill “thought the 
most fortunate human life very little worth having”(CW 1.48).  
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such, the flaw a pessimistic claim points to must be a permanent feature of human life, not a temporary 
defect caused by circumstances that might credibly change.  
 Likewise, I take pessimism to have a specific conception of the happiness it denies. Happiness 
might be identified with a particular good, one of a potentially large number of things which contribute 
to life’s value. This is how the term is used when happiness is identified directly with particular 
instances of pleasure, particular moments of contentment, etc. It is this understanding of happiness 
which underlies statements like, “I feel so happy right now,” “She was such a happy child,” etc. – 
phrases which suggest that happiness is a localized phenomenon, potentially characterizing some parts 
of a life but not others. The happiness which pessimism denies does not have this localized character. It 
involves a global judgment about the overall worth of an individual's life taken as a whole.9 At bottom, 
the function of pessimistic claims is to question life’s value to the one who lives it. As such, for a 
pessimistic claim to suggest happiness is impossible will be for it to suggest life is worth less to us on 
the whole than a truly happy life would be. This judgment is totalizing and global in the sense that it 
takes the overall worth of a human life as its object. In another sense, however, it is quite local and 
partial, for it asks only what such a life is worth to the person leading it. Thus, a pessimistic claim 
could not be answered either by identifying some particular good that life contains – say, pleasure – and 
calling it happiness, or by pointing to some benefit life provides a second party – say, God – whose 
interests are furthered by people leading lives that are of no benefit to themselves. Neither approach 
would counter the pessimistic claim that, when taken as a whole, life is worth less to those leading it 
than the idea of happiness suggests.  
 With these general remarks about pessimism out of the way, we are now ready to look at Mill's 
presentation of the particular pessimistic challenges he confronts in Utilitarianism.  
 
9 The distinction between these two uses of the term happiness is helpfully discussed in Annas 2004: 45-48 and 
Nussbaum 2008: 586-588.  
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II. The First Challenge: Life as Satisfying but Ignoble 
 
 According to the first pessimistic challenge, a life dedicated to the pursuit of pleasure is a base 
life. The identification of pleasure as the only thing desirable as an end thus entails that even the best 
human life will be base. Mill presents the critics' position as follows:  
To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure – no better and 
nobler object of desire and pursuit – they designate as utterly mean and grovelling; as a 
doctrine worthy only of swine. (CW 10.210) 
 
Mill accepts the pessimistic force of this challenge: instead of dismissing the relevance of nobility to 
happiness, he defends the nobility of the specifically human life of pleasure. Mill accepts the 
challenge's pessimistic force out of concern for the dignity of human nature: he affirms both that the 
dignity of human nature depends on the nobility of the best human life, and that human beings cannot 
be truly happy unless they bear dignified natures.  
 Mill is explicit in identifying the dignity of human nature as what is threatened by the denial of 
the best human life's nobility. Thus, his counter-charge is “that it is not [utilitarians], but their accusers, 
who represent human nature in a degrading light”(CW 10.210). Likewise, he is explicit in claiming that 
human beings cannot be happy unless they see themselves as bearing dignified natures. He declares the 
sense of dignity an “essential [] part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong”(CW 10.212), and 
suggests that anyone who thinks life might be better in its absence “confounds the two very different 
ideas, of happiness and content[ment]”(CW 10.212). For Mill, to lose the sense of dignity is to lose part 
of what makes life worth living. Our desires might be satisfied in its absence (we might find 
“content[ment]”), but even their full satisfaction would not make life as valuable to us as the concept of 
happiness suggests. My goal in this section will be to explain Mill’s acceptance of these two claims: 
why does Mill hold that the dignity of human nature depends on the nobility of the best human life, and 
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that an appreciation of that dignity is part of what makes life worth living?10  
 The first step to understanding Mill's endorsement of these claims is figuring out what he means 
by human nature. In his essay, “Nature,” Mill identifies an object's nature as  
the ensemble or aggregate of its powers or properties: the modes in which it acts on 
other things (counting among those things the senses of the observer), and the modes in 
which other things act on it; to which, in the case of a sentient being, must be added, its 
own capacities of feeling, or being conscious. (CW 10.374) 
 
In other words, Mill identifies an object's nature with what it can do and what can be done to it, i.e. 
with the sum total of its capacities for acting and undergoing. A human being's nature, then, is rightly 
identified with her potential: it is the set of things she might do or be.11 This squares well with 
Utilitarianism, for Mill presents the dignity of human nature as hinging on humanity’s capacities. Thus, 
when Mill suggests that utilitarianism's critics degrade human nature, he does so on the grounds that 
“the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are 
capable”(CW 10.210). Similarly, Mill portrays the sense of dignity as possessed not just by those who 
actually lead noble lives, but even by those who simply appreciate their capacity to lead such lives. 
Thus, he emphasizes that there is special value even in the life a person whose dignity comes out 
primarily in awareness that her life is not as noble as it could be (CW 10.212).12 As Miller 2010 
 
10 This claim about dignity’s importance to happiness should be distinguished from claims about nobility’s 
importance to happiness discussed elsewhere (e.g., Mawson 2002; Riley 2013 and 2019; and Devigne 2006a, 
2006b, and 2017). I am not directly interested in the importance of actually leading a noble life. I am 
interested in the importance of bearing a nature which makes leading a noble life possible. This is particularly 
relevant to distinguishing my approach from that of Riley 2019. Riley also focuses on the first utilitarian 
challenge, but overlooks this distinction. Thus, he explains Mill’s claims about the sense of dignity’s 
importance by appealing to his claims about the pleasure involved in actually leading a noble life (2019: 200-
201).  
11 A similar point is made in Tulloch 1989: 154. Adams 1992: 441-443 and Corcoran 2019: 481-484 emphasize 
that Mill also uses the term human nature to refer to the innate tendencies of uneducated human beings. As 
both accounts make clear, however, the identification of human nature with human potential is what matters 
for human dignity. Mill views humanity’s uneducated tendencies quite poorly. The dignity of human nature, 
consequently, hinges on humanity’s potential extending further than its uneducated instincts suggest. 
12 Riley 2019: 199-200 misconstrues this case in a way that obscures the difference between bearing a dignified 
nature and living a noble life. Mill claims it is “better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied”(CW 
10.212). As Riley reads this, Socrates’ dissatisfaction stems from desire for the fool’s pleasures: Socrates 
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helpfully puts it, the sense of dignity is a pleasure taken in “the mere possession of developed 
faculties”(61): it hinges on possessing such faculties, not expressing them. When Mill speaks about the 
dignity of human nature, he speaks about the dignity of humanity's potential.  
 There is, however, a difference between having a potential which is itself dignified and simply 
having the potential to do things which are dignified. Consider the following: although a grounded bird 
might have the potential to fly, its potential is not itself flying. Capacities do not always take on the 
properties of their expressions. When Mill speaks of the dignity of human nature, however, it is clear he 
means that human nature is itself dignified, not just that its realization might be. The dignity of human 
nature provides a source of happiness that is independent of other aspects of our nature's realization: 
our lives are enhanced by awareness that we bear natures which could be realized in noble activity even 
when hostile circumstances render such activity impossible. This makes sense only if there is 
something valuable about human nature itself, not just the things human nature allows us to do. More 
needs to be said, then, about how the nobility of the best human life secures the dignity of human 
nature. It is not clear if seeing human nature as potential nobility is the same as seeing it as itself noble. 
Nor is it clear whether seeing human nature as noble would be the same as seeing it as dignified.  
 Mill offers little explicit guidance about the transition between the potential nobility of human 
life and the dignity of human nature. Nonetheless, I take it that the link will become clear once we see 
what Mill means by nobility. For Mill, to call something noble is to call it beautiful: nobility is the term 
Mill uses to track aesthetic value within the realm of human affairs. This equation of the noble and the 
beautiful is confirmed in Mill's System of Logic, where aesthetics is identified as the branch of the Art 
 
enjoys the pleasures of leading a noble life, but is dissatisfied since leading this life requires sacrificing lesser 
goods. This is not how Mill describes Socrates’ dissatisfaction. Socrates is dissatisfied because he feels 
himself capable of a nobility he has not yet attained. This sense of his unrealized capacity for nobility is, Mill 
suggests, what makes Socrates’ life better than the fool’s: Socrates’ knowledge of his life’s deficiencies “will 
not make him envy the being who is indeed unconscious of the imperfections, but only because he feels not at 
all the good which those imperfections qualify”(CW 10.212).  
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of Life concerning “the Beautiful or Noble, in human conduct and works”(CW 8.949). Further 
confirmation is found in Mill's discussion of the “aesthetic aspect” of action in his essay on Bentham. 
Mill suggests that an action's beauty determines whether we judge it “admirable” or “mean”(CW 
10.112). I take it that the “admirable” Mill speaks of here corresponds to the noble Mill speaks of in 
other works – “mean” is, after all, the opposing term for both.13 There is, then, good reason to treat 
Mill's use of the term noble in Utilitarianism as a way of tracking aesthetic value.14  
 There is need for some caution here, as Mill has a highly moralized view of human beauty. 
Thus, Mill suggests that actions are beautiful only when expressive of a settled virtuous character.15 If 
care is taken regarding the limits Mill places on what counts as beautiful in the realm of human affairs, 
however, we can treat him as equating the beautiful and the noble in this realm. When Mill suggests 
that the dignity of human nature depends on seeing that nature as the potential to lead a noble life, he 
suggests that the dignity of human nature depends on seeing that nature as the potential to lead a 
beautiful life.  
 The question, then, is whether there is something dignified about the potential to be beautiful. 
This is easier to get a grip on than whether there is something dignified about the potential to be noble, 
if only because beautiful is more of a live term for us than noble is. As a first approach at an answer, 
consider a truly beautiful sculpture, an irreplaceable one-of-a-kind masterpiece.16 Viewed aesthetically, 
 
13 The charge, recall, was that denying the nobility of our ends renders utilitarianism “utterly mean and 
groveling.” 
14  Anderson 1991, Riley 2013, and Devigne 2017 similarly suggest that Mill sees nobility as the object of 
particularly aesthetic sentiments.  
15 Contra Heydt 2011, Mill does not consider actions beautiful only when they serve something greater than the 
agent’s own good. The uniting thread in Mill's discussions of human beauty is virtue, not self-transcendence: 
an act expressing selfless devotion is beautiful, but so is one expressing truly refined prudence. On this point, 
see Riley 2013: 113 and Devigne 2006b: 99.  
16 The analogy between a beautiful human life and a beautiful work of art is one Mill makes explicit use of in 
similar contexts elsewhere, e.g., when claiming that “Among the works of man, which human life is rightly 
employed in perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance surely is man himself”(CW 18.263). It is 
likewise common among the romantic authors who heavily influenced Mill on these issues. As helpfully 
described by Thorlby 1973, these authors’ ideal was the “shaping of one's own life, as though it were a never-
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the world is worth more for containing such a work: its presence within the world makes the world a 
more beautiful thing than it would otherwise be. From the perspective of someone for whom aesthetic 
value is a genuine type of value, such a work bears a certain weight. Its claim to be an irreplaceable 
masterwork is borne out, for its significance to the world is such that it truly makes a difference 
whether or not it is present within it. Let us ask how someone who views a work of art as significant in 
this way will view a slab of marble thought of as that work in potentia, as something that might become 
that one-of-a-kind masterpiece. Considered in this way, the marble will itself inherit much of the 
weight and significance of the sculpture. The marble matters to the world, for it has something special 
to offer it: namely, the aesthetic value of the sculpture it might become.  
The case for expecting a transfer of significance from realization to potential is even stronger 
where the relation between a beautiful human life and the nature that allows such a life is concerned. 
Considered at an individual level, the nature that each person bears is not just a port by which 
something of incredible beauty might enter the world. It is the one and only port: any given sculpture 
might have come out of any number of slabs of marble, but the beautiful life of a particular human 
being can come about only through the realization of the particular nature she bears. Thus, if the life of 
a human being can be a masterwork on par with a great sculpture, enhancing the world by its presence 
within it in the way that a great sculpture does, then the nature of a human being will bear the weight 
that properly belongs to the one and only thing capable of becoming such a masterwork. Thought of in 
this way, human nature seems the proper object of wonder or awe: it bears a special significance in 
light of its significance to the world. As a result of this significance, human nature seems to deserve a 
certain respect and consideration. It might, without any violence to the term, be described as having a 
 




certain dignity that it would otherwise lack.17  
 At this point, it is clear why Mill claims that the dignity of human nature depends on the 
nobility of the best human life. If even the best human life is ignoble, then human nature will lack the 
significance that comes with being nobility in potentia. What remains to be seen, however, is why Mill 
treats the suggestion that human nature lacks this dignity as a kind of pessimism: why can we not lead 
happy lives even without dignified natures? Mill's answer to this question focuses on the essential role 
the sense of dignity plays in human happiness: human beings, Mill suggests, do not lead truly 
worthwhile lives unless they are aware of their status as the bearers of dignified natures.  
Mill does not provide an explicit statement of what makes this awareness so vital to happiness. 
A plausible account has, however, been suggested by the preceding discussion. We have seen that when 
Mill speaks about the dignity of a creature's nature, he speaks of the dignity of her potential. The 
identity between a creature and the potential she bears is quite close: we can say of the person who has 
the capacity to lead a noble life that she is such a noble life in potentia. Thus, if the potential to lead a 
noble life is dignified, the one who bears that potential is dignified as well. An individual's sense of 
dignity amounts to awareness of herself as possessing the special significance that belongs to 
something capable of adding beauty to the world in a way that increases its worth. For an individual to 
see herself this way will be to see herself as entitled to a certain respect in light of her global 
significance. To possess a sense of dignity, then, is to have a certain respect for oneself, a respect that 
derives from one's status as a source of globally significant aesthetic value. Mill makes this connection 
between dignity and self-respect explicit in On Liberty, where the two terms are used almost 
interchangeably: the choice of a base life expresses “want of personal dignity and self-respect”(CW 
18.279). Likewise, in Principles of Political Economy, Mill praises socialized labor for cultivating “a 
 
17 This account fits well with Moshe Halbertal's observation that denying someone's gift is a way of denying her 
dignity (2015). To tell someone she has nothing significant to offer is a way of saying she herself lacks 
significance. 
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sense of personal worth and dignity”(CW 3.781), treating the sense of dignity as equivalent to a sense 
of one's worth.18  
 The importance of this self-respect is, I take it, what underlies Mill’s claim that happiness 
cannot be had without a sense of dignity. There are different glosses we might give of aesthetic self-
respect’s importance, each of which suggests a different reckoning of how much losing it would cost 
us. The lowest stakes reading simply focuses on Mill’s claim that self-respect’s intrinsic value makes it 
a large part of happiness. The sense of dignity is a particularly high-quality pleasure: it constitutes such 
a large part of life’s value that the portion of the human good left over after its loss would fall far short 
of what the idea of happiness leads us to expect.19 Were the intrinsic value of self-respect all that 
denying the best human life’s nobility cost us, however, the pessimistic force of that denial would be 
relatively mild. This is clearly weak pessimism: it suggests that life is less valuable than we might have 
hoped but not that it is not valuable at all. The affective and motivational consequences of such a claim 
might be quite limited: knowing that life offers less benefit than you hoped might be significantly 
discouraging, but it would not promote loss of interest in those benefits that might still be obtained. 
 Mill does not, however, see the loss of self-respect’s intrinsic value as the only element of this 
claim's pessimistic force. Mill also suggests that this kind of self-respect is crucial to enabling those 
with highly developed aesthetic sensibilities to take their lives seriously. For those to whom aesthetic 
value is a matter of importance, to view human life as aesthetically irrelevant is to view themselves 
with a certain contempt, as deeply insignificant from within their own value perspective. Such self-
 
18 Hauskeller 2011: 443 similarly takes Mill to treat the sense of dignity as a sense of one’s worth. Contra 
Hauskeller, however, I argue that Mill is well-positioned to explain this self-worth’s importance.  
19 That Mill sees the sense of dignity as an incomparably large part of happiness is indicated by his suggestion 
that its value explains the dignified person's unwillingness to exchange any of her higher capacities for full 
satisfaction of her lower ones (CW 10.212, discussed briefly in Devigne 2006b: 79). The intrinsic value of the 
other higher pleasures is not enough to justify this choice unless the sense of dignity is appealed to. This 
suggests that the sense of dignity constitutes a part of happiness larger not only than that constituted by the 
combined value of all lower pleasures but than that constituted by the value of any single one of the other 
higher pleasures as well. 
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contempt, in painting the individual as beneath notice, also suggests that her life is not worth leading: 
the good of a trivial, insignificant thing is itself trivial and insignificant. Thus, in A System of Logic, 
Mill defends the pursuit of nobility on the grounds that it  
would go further than all things else towards making human life happy; both in the 
comparatively humble sense, of pleasure and freedom from pain, and in the higher 
meaning, of rendering life, not what it now is almost universally, puerile and 
insignificant – but such as human beings with highly developed faculties can care to 
have. (CW 8.952)  
 
The situation is even worse for an aesthetically sensitive individual who accepts the full force of the 
critics' charge, holding that human life not only fails to add aesthetic value to the world but in fact 
diminishes its aesthetic worth. For the aesthetically sensitive person who accepts that even the best 
human life will be positively base – a “mean and groveling” existence standing as a disfiguring blot 
upon the earth – what follows is something closer to self-disgust than self-contempt.20 She figures 
herself as low not in a way that makes her irrelevant to the world, but in a way that makes her presence 
within the world a corruption of it. For such a person, the vision of the self as ignoble leaves life not 
just trivialized but condemned.  
 Here we have a sense in which denying the best human life’s nobility seems to approach strong 
pessimism: for the person of highly developed aesthetic sensitivities, taking even the best human life to 
lack aesthetic value suggests that human life is either too trivial to bother with or too ugly to tolerate. 
The situation is complicated, however, as these stark consequences only follow for those both highly 
sensitive to and highly concerned about aesthetic value, not for people in general. Those who lack 
significant sensitivity to aesthetic value or put little stock in aesthetic modes of valuation will not 
experience life as not worth living just because it lacks aesthetic significance. As such, this may not 
 
20 I take it that the proper object of contempt is something seen as insignificant and beneath notice (Aristotle, 
Rhetoric II.2, 1378b10-16), while the proper object of disgust is something that actively degrades the world 
around it (Miller 1997: 8; Rozin 1999: 433). The contemptible is base, while the disgusting is both base and 
base-making.  
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seem a genuine form of pessimism at all let alone a form of strong pessimism: it is not a form of 
pessimism to say that happiness cannot be had by those who avoidably cultivate attachment to 
excessively demanding value perspectives. Such a claim would suggest not that life is worth less to us 
than the concept of happiness suggests, but that attaining the happiness which life makes available 
requires exercising caution about our valuational commitments.  
Mill, however, has an answer to this objection. Although the problems considered above affect 
only a particular subset of human beings, Mill's larger account of happiness suggests that fully happy 
lives are available only to those within that subset.21 The exercise of our aesthetic capacities is, on 
Mill's account, a large part of the human good. Thus, if attachment to aesthetic values necessarily 
decreases attachment to human life, the pursuit of happiness would be self-defeating: committed 
pursuit of that portion of the good still available to us would result in a loss of interest in obtaining even 
that portion. Here it is not just the sense of dignity itself that is lost but aesthetic appreciation in 
general. If human life is ignoble, there is no room in it not just for dignity but also for the exercise of all 
those aesthetic capacities the cultivation of which would cause us to experience dignity's absence as a 
serious loss. The question of whether this is strong pessimism or simply a stark form of weak 
pessimism hinges on whether a life in which aesthetic appreciation played no role would still be worth 
living. This is a question Mill seems to answer negatively in other work.22  
 If a sense of dignity could not be found in even the best human life, life would be worth much 
less than expected for all of us and be barely of interest to others. Mill's discussion of the claim that the 
 
21 This worry brings Mill close to Nietzsche. Both think real happiness belongs only to the aesthetically 
sensitive, and thus treat problems facing this subset of people as challenges to the possibility of human 
happiness. Mill’s concern does not involve the same elitism as Nietzsche’s, however: he considers all people 
capable of developing the aesthetic sensitivity that makes these problems relevant. For discussion of Mill and 
Nietzsche’s different approaches to this shared concern, see Miller 2010: 66-68 and Leiter 2018: 167-69 
respectively. 
22 This is Mill’s position in the Autobiography. Working through that account would take us far afield, however, 
so I leave both interpretive options on the table for now.    
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pleasure desirer’s best life cannot be noble, then, seems to validate treating that claim as a pessimistic 
challenge. Mill has good reason to think that the possibility of happiness depends on the particularly 
aesthetic potential of human life.23  
 
III. The Second Challenge: Life as Noble but Unsatisfying 
 
 After responding to this first challenge, Mill turns his attention to a second. Interestingly, 
however, this challenge inverts the claim that constituted the first. Above, Mill confronted the charge 
that the pleasure desirer’s best life would be satisfying but ignoble. Here, he confronts the charge that 
this life would be noble but unsatisfying. In what follows, I explain why Mill treats this charge as no 
less genuine a pessimistic challenge than its opposite.  
 That Mill understands the second challenge as a pessimistic challenge is clear. His discussion 
begins by identifying his opponents as pessimists who nonetheless endorse the possibility of human 
nobility. Thus, Mill notes that utilitarianism is opposed by  
another class of objectors, who say that happiness, in any form, cannot be the rational 
purpose of human life and action; because, in the first place, it is unattainable: and they 
contemptuously ask, What right hast thou to be happy? A question which Mr. Carlyle 
clenches by the addition, What right, a short time ago, hadst thou even to be? Next, they 
say, that men can do without happiness; that all noble human beings have felt this, and 
could not have become noble but by learning the lesson of Entsagen, or renunciation; 
which lesson, thoroughly learnt and submitted to, they affirm to be the beginning and 
necessary condition of all virtue. (CW 10.214) 
 
I consider this passage in detail below. For the moment, however, it suffices to note two things. The 
charge is clearly pessimistic in nature: the critics explicitly deny the possibility of human happiness. It 
is also clearly distinct from the previous charge: the critics affirm the possibility of nobility, but suggest 
 
23 Note that accepting Mill's claims about the importance of the best human life’s beauty does not entail 
accepting his claims about that beauty’s source. The above might be accepted while rejecting Mill’s division 
between noble higher and base lower faculties, his equation of human beauty with virtue, etc. 
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it is only available after happiness is renounced. Although these claims are both are put positively – 
happiness really is impossible, nobility really is available through renunciation – they should be heard 
in the ad hominem context of Utilitarianism’s second chapter. These critics may well endorse the 
claims put forward. What matters, however, is not that they endorse them, but that they take them to be 
entailed by claims utilitarianism endorses: these critics too take their charge to follow from 
utilitarianism’s theory of life. 
 Mill initially states this charge as a generic pessimistic claim: the objectors deny the possibility 
of happiness directly, rather than identifying a specific flaw in life. However, his later glosses of the 
charge and his strategy for responding to it suggest he has something more specific in mind: these 
critics deny life’s ability to satisfy. Thus, Mill later restates the charge as a doubt “whether human 
beings, if taught to consider [pleasure] as the end of life, would be satisfied with such a moderate share 
of it”(CW 10.215).24 On this statement, the charge seems to be that utilitarianism’s theory of life 
constitutes pessimism because life will never offer enough pleasure to satisfy a creature who desires 
only pleasure. Mill's response is tailored to this understanding of the charge. He argues that people can 
be satisfied by less pleasure than the critics think, and that human life can easily contain more pleasure 
than is typical at present. As became clear above, Mill denies any direct identity between happiness and 
contentment. Thus, Mill's efforts are best understood as countering a specific variety of pessimism: 
namely, that which denies the best human life’s ability to satisfy. 
 The claim that even the best human life is insufficiently satisfying might be heard in three ways. 
 
24 To avoid confusion, I have replaced Mill's use of the word happiness with the word pleasure. Mill uses the 
term happiness inconsistently: it sometimes refers to pleasure directly and sometimes refers to a life worth 
living. In the critics' charge, happiness refers to a life worth living. Thus, Mill counters by describing a life 
available to the pleasure-desirer: “A life thus composed, to those who have been fortunate enough to obtain it, 
has always appeared worthy of the name of happiness”(CW 10.215). In the modified quote, however, Mill 
must equate happiness with pleasure directly. Otherwise, the worry expressed is incompatible with the critics' 
charge: the critics cannot claim both that happiness is impossible, and that we possess an unsatisfactorily 
small amount of it.  
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One might say that life fails to satisfy if it fails to include any genuinely desirable good. On this 
understanding, talk about life's ability to satisfy is a proxy for talk about its completeness. A life which 
is unsatisfying in this sense may frequently satisfy the actual desires of the one leading it. It may, in 
fact, satisfy every desire she actually has, leaving her perfectly content from a psychological point of 
view. What matters from this perspective is not actual desires but hypothetical ones: a life is 
unsatisfying just in case there exists some good which the life does not contain, and which the person 
leading the life would desire if she became properly aware of it.  
 On another understanding, that life fails to satisfy might mean that we will always possess at 
least one unsatisfied desire. Here again, life may be unsatisfying even if it satisfies many desires. What 
matters is the one unsatisfied desire left over, regardless of how many others were fulfilled. This 
perspective on satisfaction differs from the previous in focusing on actual desires. However, it shares 
the previous perspective's focus on completeness: on both understandings, life is satisfying only if it 
satisfies all of an agent's desires. The only point of contention is whether desires the agent could 
hypothetically be brought to have ought to be counted in the assessment.  
 On a final option, that life fails to satisfy might mean that it offers insufficient experience of 
desire satisfaction. On this understanding, desire-satisfaction is itself important, rather than mattering 
only insofar as it removes the disvalued state of unsatisfied desire. It follows that this understanding 
need not share the previous two’s focus on the complete and final satisfaction of all desire. What 
matters is the extent of opportunities for desire-satisfaction, and this will not reliably track the reduction 
of unsatisfied desire. Thus, a distinctive feature of this view is that it suggests life might be unsatisfying 
because it failed to inspire desire. An individual who possesses but one weak desire may easily attain 
complete and final satisfaction. Likewise, even if an individual's life contains only paltry goods, it will 
qualify as complete if those goods are the only ones conceivable. On the previous two understandings, 
then, life might be satisfying while still allowing few opportunities for the actual experience of desire 
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satisfaction. They focus on whether or not the individual's (real or hypothetical) desires are fully 
satisfied, but are not concerned with whether those desires are sufficiently extensive to make their 
satisfaction notable. On the present understanding, in contrast, a life's satisfying quality depends on the 
extent of the opportunities for satisfaction it allows. This will be a product of both the extent of the 
desires it provokes and the frequency with which those desires are fulfilled.  
 This third understanding of the claim that life cannot satisfy must be what Mill has in mind. He 
is explicitly interested in questions about whether life provides enough to desire. Thus, he worries that 
selfish interests diminish with age, a concern he counters by pointing to the possibility of developing 
desires focused on things other than oneself (CW 10.215). Such a reduction of desire is a threat to life's 
capacity to satisfy only on the third understanding of what this capacity entails. The second group of 
critics, then, claim that insufficient instances of desire satisfaction would be found in the pleasure 
desirer’s best life. What remains is to explain why Mill treats this claim as a pessimistic challenge: 
given that Mill does not identify happiness with contentment, why does he grant that a life which 
offered few instances of desire satisfaction would be an unhappy one?  
 In answering this question, it will help to look more closely at the assemblage of claims Mill 
associates with the challenge. The critics claim: 1) that even the best human life is unsatisfying; 2) that 
individuals have no right to be happy or even exist; and 3) that true nobility is possible only when 
happiness is renounced. I take it that Mill sees these claims as united by a shared effect: namely, a 
reduction of the individual's interest in her own life. An individual whose life testifies to the truth of the 
first claim will, Mill suspects, undergo a naturalized version of the renunciation enjoined by the other 
two. She will lose interest in her life for psychological rather than moral reasons. The critics claim that 
we have no hope of retaining an interest in ourselves, but suggest this is a fortunate circumstance: true 
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nobility begins only after interest in one’s life comes to an end.25 Further support for this interpretation 
of the threat insufficient satisfaction poses is found in Mill's characterization of his solutions to it. Thus, 
responding to the claim that life becomes less satisfying over time, Mill counters that those with 
sympathetic concerns and intellectual passions “retain as lively an interest in life on the eve of death as 
in the vigor of youth” and find “sources of inexhaustible interest in all that surrounds [them]”(CW 
10.215-16). This counter is relevant because Mill's worry is that when life ceases to satisfy it ceases to 
engage.  
 Mill has good reason to connect a failure of engagement with insufficient satisfaction. On Mill’s 
understanding of the claim that life cannot satisfy, a life which offers insufficient satisfaction is one 
which offers insufficient opportunity for the fulfillment of desire. Life may fail an individual in this 
respect for either of two reasons: it may offer too little to desire, or it may allow the satisfaction of 
desire with insufficient frequency. In either case, the failure will leave the individual with little basis for 
engagement with her own life. The one who finds little in life to desire expects nothing of it right from 
the start: she has no interest in her life, for it seems to have nothing to offer her. The one whose desires 
are never satisfied soon works her way around to the same position: the things that interest her have no 
place within her life, and her interest in them thus creates no interest in it. This is a version of what 
Reginster 2006 calls the problem of inspiration. The interest we take in our lives depends on our 
interest in the ends we hope to realize or enjoy within those lives. Taking an interest in our lives thus 
 
25 Carlyle defends the Entsagen view in these terms. Finding happiness impossible, we lose interest in ourselves 
and take interest in our work. Thus, he encourages renouncing interest in our own lives by noting that the 
rewards of such interest never satisfy: “Thou wilt never sell thy Life, or any part of thy Life, in a satisfactory 
manner. Give it, like a royal heart; let the price be Nothing: thou has then, in a certain sense got All for 
it!”(Carlyle 1843: 175). In replacing interest in our lives with interest in our work, we do not simply find a 
new object of desire. Rather, although our desires remain focused on pleasure, desire ceases to be our only 
motive. We stop being automatons moved by our desires and become free, self-moving agents. Thus, Carlyle 
presents desire-based motivational theories as fundamentally impoverished and degrading: “of Volition 
except as the synonym of Desire, we hear nothing; of 'Motives,' without any Mover, more than 
enough"(Carlyle 1831: 358).  
21 
requires us to have ends which we see as both valuable and potentially realizable within our life (24-
25). For the person who finds nothing to desire, no end appears valuable. For the person whose desires 
are never met, no end appears realizable. In either case, an end which is both realizable and worthy of 
realization is absent. Thus, in either case, there is nothing to inspire engagement with one’s life.  
 As Mill sees it, there are two possible results of such disengagement. The individual may 
simply give up on life, lacking motive to maintain an existence from which nothing is expected (CW 
10.214). Alternatively, an individual sufficiently swayed by the moralizing arguments for renunciation 
considered above might stick around, dutifully passing her life in noble displays of self-sacrifice 
despite finding no satisfaction in doing so. This second option does not solve the problem, however. 
For Mill suggests that the reason for living provided by such dutiful nobility and self-sacrifice is flawed 
in a way that renders it unsustainable. A sacrifice must be carried out for the sake of something or 
someone. This is what distinguishes it from mere imprudence. There is nothing beautiful or noble about 
profligacy: it is the fact that the individual's good is relinquished for the sake of some valuable end that 
marks action off as sacrifice rather than squandering (CW 10.217-18). From the perspective of someone 
who sees no hope for satisfaction, however, there are no valuable ends sacrifice might serve. As Mill 
clearly indicates, unselfish desires are no less desires for their unselfishness. Thus, the person who 
finds no satisfaction in life can have no realizable unselfish desires either. Those unselfish ends that 
strike her as worthy of realization must be unrealizable, while those unselfish ends which are realizable 
must strike her as unworthy of realization. The person whose life offers no opportunity for satisfaction 
cannot engage in noble self-sacrifice: just as she cannot live for herself, neither can she truly live for 
anything else.26 The claim that even the best human life cannot satisfy, then, seems to possess dire 
 
26 It may be worth distinguishing Mill’s critique from a similar argument of Bentham’s. Like Mill, Bentham finds 
asceticism’s elevation of self-sacrifice inconsistent (IPML, 11-13). The ascetic claims that pleasure is harmful 
and pain beneficial. This suggests that benefitting another requires causing her pain. The ascetic, however, 
also considers intentionally causing another pain immoral. This renders her calls to self-sacrifice incoherent: 
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pessimistic force, leaving individuals without any stable motive to continue living.  
 
IV. Understanding Pessimism  
 
 At the essay’s start, I quoted the pessimistic fear that plagued Mill during his crisis: namely, the 
worry that there might be “a flaw in life itself.” As our discussion has shown, however, pessimism does 
not rest on attributing any single flaw to life. There are multiple, sometimes quite opposed flaws which 
might undermine life’s value. Thus, Mill had good reason to treat two inverted claims about life’s 
defects as bearing legitimate pessimistic force: happiness is equally outside our reach whether the best 
human life is satisfying but ignoble or noble but unsatisfying. Our discussion of Mill, then, has shown 
that pessimism is a plural concept. There will be many distinct pessimisms, each deriving its force from 
the attribution of a distinct flaw to the best possible human life. Mill helped us understand two such 
pessimisms, but many others remain unexamined.   
 More needs to be said about this effort’s significance. What do we gain from understanding 
pessimisms like these? The straightforward answer is that pessimism must be understood to be 
assessed. The significance of assessing pessimistic charges is not, however, something this essay 
emphasized. I bracketed questions about the accuracy of the pessimistic challenges under 
consideration, focusing instead on understanding what makes them pessimistic challenges in the first 
 
if morality requires sacrifice for the benefit of others, then morality requires doing wrong. Mill points to a 
different inconsistency. The ascetic claims that ends we deem worthy of realization cannot be realized. 
Sacrifice, however, must be directed at realizing worthy ends. In recommending self-sacrifice, then, the 
ascetic recommends a kind of action she should consider impossible. The key difference is that Mill takes 
asceticism to hinge on a descriptive pessimistic premise while Bentham does not. Bentham thought 
asceticism originated in hope and fear: earthly happiness is renounced to win honor and avert divine 
punishment (IPML, 9). Mill, in contrast, thought asceticism originated in despair: earthly happiness is 
renounced because it cannot be obtained (see, e.g., his suggestion at CW 27.666 that increased availability of 
happiness inevitably breaks asceticism’s appeal). Mill and Bentham understand asceticism’s grounds 
differently, and thus take different approaches to its critique.  
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place. Thus, I attempted to bring out Mill's reasons for accepting the pessimistic force of the two 
charges, but gave little attention to his reasons for thinking that both misrepresent the pleasure-desirer’s 
best life. It is my hope that this way of proceeding brought out an answer to the question “Why study 
pessimism?” that differs from the straightforward answer that pessimism must be understood to be 
assessed. For I take the preceding discussion to have shown that simply understanding why a particular 
pessimistic claim qualifies as a pessimistic claim is enough to teach us something important about the 
nature of a happy life.   
Each pessimistic claim suggests the best human life is flawed in some specific respect. Each 
also presents itself as posing a specific threat to the possibility of happiness. To understand a 
pessimistic claim as a pessimistic claim will be to grasp the link between the flaw it attributes to the 
best human life and the threat to happiness it poses. Thus, we understood the pessimistic force of the 
denial of the best human life's nobility when we grasped the link between this denial and the loss of 
self-respect, and we understood the pessimistic force of the denial of the best human life's capacity to 
satisfy when we grasped the link between this denial and the loss of interest in one's life. To grasp this 
link is to see why a life cannot be called happy if it possesses the flaw attributed to it by the variety of 
pessimism under consideration.  
 It is thus fortunate that the history of philosophy has made a good number of interesting 
pessimistic claims available to us. We may think that many of these claims are ultimately false, 
condemning life on the basis of flaws it need not possess. Nonetheless, there is still much to learn from 
them. For we have seen that our knowledge of the things that make human life worth living is enhanced 
by understanding the flaws that would condemn it, regardless of whether or not any actually do.27  
 
 
27   For extremely helpful feedback on previous drafts, I am grateful to Agnes Callard, Brian Leiter, Dale Miller, 
Martha Nussbaum, two anonymous reviewers for Utilitas, and participants in several forums at the University 
of Chicago where drafts were discussed. 
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